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Abstract
There is a growing tendency towards the establishment of semi-autonomous revenue authorities to
collect taxes on behalf of the government. This is necessary for the efficient tax collection by which
the state finances its administrative organs. Tax administration as part of the general civil service
has suffered due to budget restrictions, inefficiency and corruption resulting from the mere
characteristics of the field of public administration.
As a remedy, modern tax administrations are now introducing the principles and methods used in
the private sector. The trend in public administration, thus, seems to be towards autonomy and
professionalization. Strengthening tax administration is thus critical to the successful
implementation of the whole tax system. Tax administration, to be successful, needs the
simplification of tax policy, commitment at the political and managerial level, and the existence of a
comprehensive set of strategies. There is evidence that the creation of semi-autonomous tax
authorities has enabled some developing countries to dramatically increase tax revenue.
These semi-autonomous revenue authorities are created with the aim of generating additional
revenue, improving the tax system and ensuring more equitable taxation. The revenue authorities'
model keeps the better employees by better compensation, is flexible in human resources
management, integrates tax operations, and is flexibile in budget management. Despite their
similarity in objective there are some variations of organizational design of revenue authorities from
country to country, with differences in their legal foundation, governance structures, staffing,
funding basis, and internal organization.
However, there are arguments against semi-autonomous revenue authorities and that they are not a
panacea of tax administration. The arguments against the revenue authorities' model are higher
costs, discontent of the wider civil service (because of inequities of salary), risks involved in the
autonomy, potential for corruption, sustainability and necessity. Nevertheless, the advantages of
revenue authorities weigh more than the disadvantages. To overcome the disadvantages of semi-
autonomous revenue authorities, there should be a clearly defined relationship between the
government and the revenue authorities, there should be an appropriate regulatory framework and
public accountability, and the structure should be as simple as possible.
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Opsomming
Daar is 'n groeiende tendens na die totstandkoming van semi-outonome inkomste owerhede om
belasting namens die regering in te vorder. Dit is nodig vir die doeltreffende invordering van
belasting deur middel waarvan die staat sy administratiewe organe finansier. Belasting
administrasie, as deel van die algemene staatsdiens het gely deur begrotingsbeperkings,
ondoeltreffendheid en korrupsie wat voortvloei uit die blote kenmerke van die gebied van die
openbare administrasie.
As 'n remedie, is moderne belasting administrasies besig om die beginsels en metodiek wat in die
privaat sector gebruik word in te voer. Die tendens in publieke administrasie is dus gerig op
outonomiteit en professionalisme. Die versterking van belasting administrasie is dus krieties vir die
suksesvolle implimentering van die hele belastingsisteem. Belasting administrasie, om suksesvol te
wees, benodig die vereenvoudiging van belasting beleid, verbondenheid op politieke en
bestuursvlak en die bestaan van 'n omvattende stel strategieë. Daar is getuienis dat die
totstandkoming van semi-outonome belastingowerhede het sekere ontwikkelende lande in staat
gestelom dramaties die belasting inkomste te vermeerder.
Hierdie semi-outonome inkomste owerhede is tot stand gebring met die doelom addisionele
inkomste te genereer, die belastingsisteem te verbeter en om meer billike belastingte verseker. Die
belastingowerhede model behou die beter werknemers deur middel van beter kompensasie, is
buigsaam t.o.v. menslike hulpbronbestuur, integreer belastingsprosesse en is buigsaam in
begrotingsbestuur. Nieteenstaande hul eendersheid t.o.v die doelwitte, is daar wel variasies van
organisasie ontwerp van belastingowerhede van land tot land, met verskille in hul regsgrondslag,
"governance" strukture, personeelvoorsiening, basis van bevondsing en die interne organisasie.
Daar is wel argumente teen semi-outonome belastingowerhede en dat hulle nie die wondermiddel
vir belasting administrasie is nie. Die argumente teen die belastingowerhede model is dié van hoer
kostes, ontevredenheid van die breë openbare administrasie (weens die onbillikheid van salarisse),
die risko verbondce aan die outonomiteit, die potensiaal vir korrupsie, volhoubaarheid en
noodsaaklikheid. Desnieteenstaande, die voordele van belastingowerhede weeg sterker as die
nadele. Om die nadele te oorkom, moet daar 'n duidelike uiteengesette verhouding tussen die
regering en die belastingowerhede wees, daar moet 'n toepaslike regulerende raamwerk en openbare
toerekenbaarheid en die struktuuer moet so eenvoudig moontlik wees.
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Chapter One
1. Introduction
There is a general consensus in modern societies that
governments have to collect taxes so as to finance public
administration and the provision of economic and social
services (Gildenhuys, 1997:211). This shows that collection of
taxes by governments is necessary and unquestionable. What
is questionable is by what administrative process and structures
the taxes should be collected. Should governments collect the
taxes themselves or just make sure that adequate taxes are
collected? In the past governments have collected taxes
themselves.
In the words of Savas (as quoted in Osborne and Gaebler,
1992:25), "the word government is from a Greek word which
means 'to steer'. The job of government is to steer, not to row
the boat. Delivering services is rowing, and governments are
not very good at rowing". In the case of collection of taxes or tax
administration, tax administration was the exclusive
responsibility of the state under a Ministry of Finance. Recently,
however, countries have begun to adopt semi- autonomous
Revenue Authorities.
The established semi-autonomous revenue authorities are
empowered with legal, personnel and financial independence.
The establishment of these authorities is deemed necessary to
make the administration of taxes efficient and effective and thus
allow the collection of more taxes. Where the collection of taxes
was previously carried out by government, the new market-
friendly environment requires a number of organizational
changes with a view to separating and more clearly defining
responsibilities for policy and planning, regulation, and service
provision.
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The developing world, especially countries in Africa and Latin
America, has been at the forefront of this trend. In Africa many
countries, starting with Ghana, are creating revenue authorities
to reform their tax administration (Devas et al., 2001:211-212).
In this paper, arguments for and against revenue authorities
and the organizational design of the revenue authorities
established in many countries are discussed in detail. In
addition, this paper studies the literature to determine whether
revenue authorities are the right vehicles for successful tax
administration reform.
1.1. Motive/rationale
As Tanzi (in Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher, 1992:iii) noted,
while there are many books and journal articles written about
tax reform, it is amazing to see how little research has been
done on the ways to improve tax administration. Less attention
was paid to the need to improve the tax administration so as to
support the overall tax reform (World Bank, 1991:8). In practice
any tax reform, which ignores improvement in the tax
administration, is doomed to failure. In addition, a poorly
administered tax system weakens the effectiveness of the
desired tax structure and raises distortions (World Bank,
1991:27).
Therefore tax reform should address the issue of tax
administration and tax structure simultaneously as they are
dependent on each other. The objective of this paper then is to
study the semi-autonomous revenue authority model and its
contribution in reforming the tax administration. Thus the
contribution of this paper is to help to fill the gap in the literature
on tax reform by reviewing the revenue authority model.
2
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1.2. Problem Statement
Tax administration reform can take place by improving the
following: Taxpayer identification and records, assessment
procedures, payment and collection systems, legal instruments,
enforcement action against defaulters, accounting and auditing
systems, and the application of information technology and so
on (Devas et al., 2001:211).
Although it is not intended to cover all the above improvements
within the scope of this paper, it is possible to consider the
organizational options by which the above improvements can
take place. One such organizational option is the semi-
autonomous revenue authority. The organizational approach of
the revenue authority is claimed to have a positive impact in the
tax administration reform. Based on this assumption the
problem to be investigated is:
Are revenue authorities appropriate vehicles for successful
implementation of tax administration reform?
In this problem there are two variables, a dependent variable
and an independent variable. The dependent variable is tax
administration reform and the independent variable is the
revenue authority.
1.3. Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this study is that the establishment of a
revenue authority improves tax administration.
3
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1.4. Research design and methodology
The study is exploratory and descriptive. To test the hypothesis
a literature research is undertaken. That is, existing literature in
the area is reviewed. These are books, journal articles, and
data from the Internet.
1.5. Structure of the assignment
The assignment has four chapters. Chapter One provides the
introduction to the study. In this section the motive or rationale
of the study, the problem statement, research design and
methodology are discussed.
Chapters Two and Three review the literature. In Chapter Two
the broad area of tax administration reform is reviewed and
topics like the modern public and tax administration, the trend in
tax administration and the prerequisites for tax administration
reform are discussed. Chapter Three deals with the literature
related to the 'organizational approach' of reforming tax
administration. Special attention is given to issues like the origin
of revenue authorities and the motive behind the establishment
of revenue authorities. In addition reasons for and against
revenue authorities and the organizational design of various
revenue authorities are reviewed in detail. Finally chapter Four
is devoted to conclusion.
4
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Chapter Two
Tax administration reform
2.1. Introduction
"Modern democratic societies need a modem, democratic public
administration which will satisfy the public's requirements in the best
possible manner. Public administration must continually undergo change
and adjustment if it is to satisfy two opposite requirements. On one hand,
it must be effective and efficient, which is achieved by implementing the
same methods used in modern company management. On the other, it
must satisfy the democratic requirements, fairness and justice and,
defend the achievements of civilisation" (Ott, 1998:1).
To achieve the above often-opposing objectives at the same
time reform has been taking place in the area of public
administration. That is, the effort to make government more
efficient and effective has been going on for the last two
decades. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:6)
Management reform results in producing cheaper, more
efficient government with higher quality services and more
effective programmes. Furthermore, it also results in improved
political control, free managers to manage and makes
government more transparent. That is why today public
management reforms are sweeping many countries. Tax
administration is one area of Public Administration, which is
being affected by this reform.
This chapter discusses the issue of modern public
administration in general and tax administration in particular.
Furthermore the trend in tax administration and the reason why
the improvement of the tax administration is necessary are
discussed.
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2.2. The distinctiveness of Public Administration
There are certain characteristics that make Public
Administration peculiar. Caiden (1982, 14-16) identifies seven
characteristics: First, one cannot avoid Public Administration.
One may not need to go to church, or buy a particular product
or join any interest group or give to charities. These can be
dependent on the willingness of individuals. Public
Administration, however, cannot be evaded. The will of the
public must be done. Even death is not a solution, for one
needs a death certificate to be allowed to discontinue one's
public duties!
Second, it expects compliance. Other organizations must
employ the machinery of Public Administration - the law courts,
police system, prisons and militia, while public administration
has the monopoly of coercive power.
Third, it has priority. "... public administration accepts the moral
responsibility of being present at all times with sufficient
reserves to meet most contingencies. This in turn, impels it to
demand high safety margins, more than enough to be certain,
something that the community may not be able to afford."
Fourth, it is exceptionally large. So as to be able to supply the
public with the required goods and services, Public
Administration has the largest single multipurpose organizations
outside multinational organizations and universal churches.
This has its own advantages and disadvantages. The
advantages are that it can exploit the economies of scale
(standardization, professionalism, routinization, and
specialization). The disadvantages are related to size and
complexity, which in the absence of competition can be
inefficient, time consuming and ineffective.
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Fifth, the top management of Public Administration is political.
That is, it is managed by politics and not by business insight or
scientific precision. According to Cloete (1998, 91) this is what
makes Public Administration primarily different from the
management of business organizations.
Sixth, it is difficult to measure its performance objectively.
Security, safety, health, peace, education, justice, prosperity,
equality and liberty are vulnerable to objective measurement.
What constitutes adequate performance differs based on
subjective opinions and expectations.
Seventh, more is expected of public administration. That is to
say what is expected of public administration is limitless.
This being what makes public administration distinct from the
private sector, there is now a new role being played by modern
public administration.
2.3. Modern Public and Tax Administration
Modern Public Administration is somewhat different from
traditional Public Administration. According to Ott (1998:1)
Public Administration is becoming more and more specialized in
the process of providing services to the public. The time that
public servants can work as a generalist in any area of public
administration has gone.
Jenkins (1994:75) states that today Public Administration is
playing a new role in a democratic society. This role is
represented by the two principles mentioned below:
1) Public Administration is an entity whose main function is to
render services to its citizens. This view abandons the
thinking that deemed Public Administration as an
organization vested with vast powers and privileges which
7
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could act irrespective of the needs and interests of the
public;
2) Public Administration is a series of differentiated functions
that have different organizational needs, interests and
working methods. This requires that we abandon the 19th
century view that Public Administration is a set of more or
less homogenous functions where the generalist can move
easily between functions or departments (Jenkins, 1998:75).
2.4. Trends in tax administration
Tax administration has always been part of the bigger Public
Administration (Jenkins, 1994:76; Ott, 1998:2). As outlined in
Section 2.2 of this chapter, Public Administration is generally
characterized by inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Tax
administration as part of the general civil service has suffered
due to budget restrictions, inefficiency and corruption resulting
from the mere characteristics of the field of public
administration.
But if tax administration is to be successful it must collect
revenues due to the government and at the same time offer an
optimum public service. It must also lower the administrative
and compliance costs of taxation. To achieve these objectives
tax administrations are now introducing the principles and
methods used in the private sector. The trend in tax
administration, thus, seems towards autonomy and
professionalisation (Jenkins, 1994:76; Byrne, 1995:13; Ott,
1998:2).
According to Jenkins (1994:76) autonomy of tax administration
can be achieved by following the example of central banks,
making tax administrations financially and administratively
autonomous. One option in which this autonomy can be
achieved is by the creation of revenue authorities. How the
8
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revenue authority model can achieve the efficiency and
effectiveness sought by many tax administrations is discussed
in Chapter 3.
2.5. Why improve tax administration?
Tax administration is of paramount importance to those who are
concerned with the key role that increased tax yields can play in
restoring macroeconomic balance and to those concerned with
the tax policy and its impact on the economy. Tax
administration has, indeed, a great impact in determining the
real or effective tax system (Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher,
1992:1). That is why Casanegra de Jantscher (as quoted in Bird
and Casanegra de Jantscher, 1992:1) equated the tax
administration with the tax policy. In his own words "tax
administration is tax policy."
This is to say that good tax policy without good tax
administration is useless. If what the law intended to achieve
and the actual implementation differ, distortions in the economy
and reduced revenue yields will be the outcome of the tax
policy (Jenkins, 1994:75). Strengthening tax administration is
thus critical to the successful implementation of the whole tax
system (World Bank, 1991:51).
2.6. Prerequisites for successful tax administration
reform
There are certain prerequisites that must be fulfilled if tax
administration reform is to be successful. According to Bird and
Casanegra de Jantscher (1992:3-4) these are:
• Simplification of the tax policy or system;
• Commitment at both the policymaking and managerial
level; and
9
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
• The existence of a clearly and comprehensively set
strategy.
2.6.1. Simplification of the tax policy
Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher (1992:3) state that it is
senseless to try to improve the tax administration without
simultaneously improving the tax structure so that it is easy to
administer. According to Gillis (as cited by Bahl and Martinez-
Vazquez, 1992:83) there is a belief held by tax analysts that a
simplification of the tax structure leads to the ease of the tax
administration.
Various reasons are furnished to prove why simplification of the
tax policy is an important prerequisite for tax administration
reform. According to the World Bank (1991:51) one of the main
contributing factors to weak administration is the excessive
complexity of tax laws and the burden this places on the limited
enforcement capacity of most tax administrations in developing
countries.
The complexity of the tax laws leads to non-compliance on the
part of the taxpayers. The fact that the tax law is complex
makes it both more difficult for taxpayers if they want to comply
with the tax law and easier for them to evade if they want to
evade (World Bank, 1991:26). In addition complex tax laws
increase the burden of tax administration by increasing the cost
of auditing and litigation. Therefore based on these facts one
can conclude simplifying the tax law is crucial and a
prerequisite to make tax administration simpler and more
efficient (World Bank, 1991:51).
10
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2.6.2. Commitment at policymaking and managerial level
Commitment at both the policy making and managerial level is
another prerequisite of tax administration reform. According to
Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher (1992:4) even the simplest
tax law and the best reform strategy are doomed to failure if
there is no any political will at the top to implement it.
There must also be local expertise, although initial support can
be acquired from foreign experts. The existence of a committed
managerial team with the full support from those holding
political office is also of paramount importance to improve the
quality of tax administration. Otherwise any tax administration
reform effort will remain in vain (Bird and Casanegra de
Jantscher, 1992:4).
2.6.3. The existence of a strategy
The existence of a clearly and comprehensively set strategy is
a third and necessary ingredient for a successful tax
administration reform. Since there is no single strategy that is
appropriate for all countries, countries should adopt strategies
that are tailored to their needs (Bird and Casanegra de
Jantscher, 1992:4). One of the recently adopted strategies for
reforming tax administration is the creation of semi-autonomous
revenue authorities (Devas et al., 2001:211-212). This is
discussed in detail in the following chapter.
2.7. Chapter summary
In this chapter the concept of tax administration reform was
discussed. The distinctiveness of the field of public
administration was first considered and then focused on how
the modem public administration is evolving. It was shown that
11
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public administration in general and tax administration in
particular is changing by introducing the principles and methods
used in the private sector. The trend in tax administration is
thus towards autonomy and professionalisation.
The reason why it is important to improve tax administration
and the prerequisites for successful tax administration were
also discussed. Simplification of the tax policy or system,
commitment at both the policymaking and managerial level and
the existence of a clearly and comprehensively set strategy are
identified as the three main ingredients of a successful tax
administration reform.
The next chapter deals with the revenue authority model in
depth as one strategy of improving tax administration.
12
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Chapter Three
Revenue authorities
3.1. Introduction
"Contemporary public administrators often look forward to the opportunity to
expand their horizons, to deal with other people and cultures, to surf the
Internet and other telecommunications and information technology global
highways, to eliminate unnecessary constraints on creativity, and to explore
new organizational and interjurisdictional structures" (Cooper et.al, 1998:10).
It was stated in Chapter Two that an organizational approach
that has received recent attention in the area of tax
administration, is the creation of semi-autonomous revenue
authorities. From the beginning, this form of organizational
model appears to have worked well in many developing
countries in increasing administrative efficiency and
effectiveness. In Africa the revenue authority model has been
adopted in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,
South Africa and Rwanda (Polidano, 1999:6; Devas et al.,
2001,213).
The creation of these revenue authorities has enabled many
governments in the above-mentioned countries of Africa to
raise wages, get rid of poor performers and hire better-qualified
staff, offer bonuses in return for meeting revenue targets, and
operate on a self-financing basis. According to Polidano
(1999:6) the amalgamation of customs and income tax
departments under the revenue authorities is a particularly
noteworthy African trend.
Devas et al. (2001, 213) state that in some countries revenue
authorities have dramatically increased tax revenue. In Ghana,
for example, the revenue authority known as Ghana's National
Revenue Secretariat (subsequently replaced by Revenue
Agencies Governing Board) brought revenue intakes up from
13
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4.6 to 17 per cent of GOP between 1983 and 1994. Similar
results are recorded in Uganda where the Ugandan Revenue
Authority increased its tax revenue from 7 per cent of GOP in
1990/1 to 11 percent in 1995/6, despite reductions in tax rates.
That is why the revenue authority model is becoming popular in
many countries, especially those in the developing world. In this
chapter the revenue authority model is discussed in detail. Its
origin, the arguments for and against revenue authorities, its
governance structure and other issues are examined based on
the literature.
3.2. Revenue authority defined
As explained in the introductory section, the creation of semi-
autonomous revenue authorities is recently gaining momentum.
But what is revenue authority? Before defining the terminology,
it is worthy noting that the term revenue authority is not used in
the same way universally. In different countries different names
are used to denote the term revenue authority as used in this
paper. For instance, Revenue Service (South Africa), National
Revenue Secretariat (Ghana from 1986 to 1998) Revenue
Agencies Governing Board (Ghana from 1998 onwards),
Revenue Board (Jamaica) and Revenue Authority (Zambia,
Uganda and Kenya). Thus in this paper Revenue Authority is
used as a generic word to represent all revenue authorities in
different countries.
Semi-autonomous revenue authorities are defined as "tax
administrations that have greater than usual autonomy along
several organizational design dimensions, including: legal
character, financing, governance, personnel policy,
procurement policy, and accountability relationships" (World
Bank, 2002).
14
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Thus the term revenue authority can be used to mean a form of
organization, which is vested with legal, personnel and financial
independence to collect the revenues of a given country.
Revenue authorities being a particular form of organization,
they could be public organisations, public organisations outside
the civil service or a corporate body (World Bank, 2002).
3.3. Origins of the revenue authority model
According to Devas et al. (2001:211) the revenue authority
model originated from the executive agency model that was
popular in many developed countries in the 1980s. But what are
executive agencies? Caulfield (2002:211) states that agencies
are a particular form of public organizations that are used as an
instrument in unbundling bureaucracy and creating more
flexible and performance oriented public organizations.
In fact, executive agencies have served as a tool in the
modernization objectives of governments in several countries in
both the developed and developing worlds. The argument in
favor of executive agencies is that they can be administered in
a private-like form of managing public sector organizations in
quest of improved efficiency and effectiveness in regulation and
service delivery (Caulfield, 2002:211).
According to Caulfield (2002:211) agencies, being task-
oriented, carry out functions of government as entities separate
from their parent ministries. Caulfield (2002:211) outlines four
prominent characteristics of the executive agency form:
.:. Decentralized management (including limited financial
autonomy);
.:. Task specialization;
.:. Outputs focused;
.:. Performance contracting.
15
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Executive agencies and Revenue Authorities are similar in that
both are managed in a business like mentality. The difference
between the two is that executive agencies can be any form of
public organizations that are performance oriented while
Revenue Authorities are specifically designed to collect
revenues (Caulfield, 2002:211).
3.4. The motive behind the creation of revenue
authorities
The rationale behind the creation of semi-autonomous revenue
authorities varies in different countries. In Ghana and Uganda
the motive was primarily the serious financial position of the
governments and the need to improve the inefficiency in the
existing revenue administration system (Devas et. ai,
2001:213). Terkper (1999:171) outlines the reasons behind the
establishment of the Revenue Agencies Governing Board of
Ghana as follows:
~ To raise the efficiency of assessment and collection with
a view to increasing revenue;
~ To increase the level of taxpayer services and voluntary
compliance;
~ To improve coordination among, and supervision of, the
revenue agencies; and
~ To contribute to a relatively more effective formulation
and implementation of revenue and fiscal policy.
Thus in most countries, as in Ghana and Uganda, the main
purpose behind the establishment of the revenue authorities is
the need to increase revenue yields (Devas et. ai, 2001:213).
In some countries, mainly Kenya and South Africa the motive
was not to generate additional tax revenues (or at least,
increasing the tax/GDP ratio). The aim was to make the system
16
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of the tax administration more efficient and effective so as to
relieve the tax burden on the economy and ensure more
equitable taxation (Oevas et. al, 2001:213).
As can be seen from Table 1 an interesting finding is that even
though generating additional revenue was not the primary
motive for the establishment of SARS, revenue has gradually
increased since SARS was established. And the increase is
partly attributed to the establishment of SARS (Devas et al.,
2001:213). According to the World Bank (1991:17-18) the tax-
GOP ratio in itself, however is not an adequate measure of
revenue performance. That is incremental changes in the level
of taxation should reflect the benefits derived from incremental
changes in the public expenditure program and the relative
costs of financing it by means of taxation or nontax revenue.
Table 1: South Africa- Tax Revenue as a percentage of GOP
Year Tax Revenues GOP at Factor Cost Tax Revenue
at current prices (Billions of Rand) Percentage
(Billions of Rand) of GOP
1994 103.3 385.1 26.8%
1995 118.4 430.9 27.5%
1996 154.4 484.1 28.4%
1998 174.4 529.6 29.2%
1999 188.7
Source: Oevas et al., 2001:213
3.5. Arguments for a revenue authority model
If revenue authorities are created with the aim of generating
additional revenues, improving the tax system and ensuring
more equitable taxation, then it follows that there must be
certain advantages that make the revenue authority model
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attractive. In this section we will see some of the justifications
provided for adopting the revenue authority model.
3.5.1. Compensation
One of the main advantages of the revenue authority model is
related to compensation. Generally, in most countries the pay
rate in the civil service is too low in comparison with the private
sector. This is especially true in developing countries. This
makes recruitment and preservation of competent staff difficult
for tax departments within the civil service (Byrne, 1995; Devas
et. al, 2001:214).
The point is well caught in the following quotation from Jenkins
(1994:76):
A serious impediment to change in the tax administration of many
countries is that revenue institutions have traditionally been part of the
general civil service. In many countries this has resulted in salaries that
are too low to recruit and retain the quality of skills needed for the efficient
operation of a revenue system.
Schlemenson (1992:358) identifies three main factors that
affect worker satisfaction in the area of tax administration.
These are
• Compensation
• The work itself and the opportunities it affords for the
exercise of individual ability and judgment.
• Development, advancement and career opportunities.
According to Schlemenson (1992:360-361) problems related to
compensation are among the main reasons why competent
employees are lost to the private sector, which usually provides
a better salary than the tax administration within the general
civil service. Schlemenson (1992:361) is of the view that to
improve the effectiveness of the tax administration, its wage
policy must be revised. The World Bank (World Bank, 1991:53)
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also suggests as an option increasing the pay scale of tax
employees to above that of the general civil service. One way,
in which this view can be implemented, is through the revenue
authority model.
Devas et al (2001:214) states that the low pay rate is not the
only drawback to the recruitment and retention of qualified staff.
The narrowness of the range between top and bottom grades
also creates a problem. In addition, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to pay staff within the civil service an incentive
bonus based on performance.
It is also believed, although not substantiated by evidence, that
staff who are paid low salaries, are prone to corruption (Byrne,
1995; Devas et ai, 2001:214). This view is also shared by
Chand and Meone (1997:4). They state that, if officers in the tax
departments are poorly paid, or an adjustment strategy like
wage control in the context of massive price increases forced
them to be so, they are more likely to engage in corruption.
This has been clearly stated by Jenkins (1994:76) "... hiring
practices become part of the political patronage system where
the main remuneration of an employee arises from the person's
given ability to extract compensation for favours given, or is
based on a person's ability to use information obtained while
working in the public sector to his private profit either
immediately or later. There are few places in the public sector
where there are greater opportunities for these kinds of
remuneration than in the tax administrations. In such a situation
the tax administration will be perceived as being inefficient,
incompetent and corrupt."
Given the above problems, which arise from the low pay rate in
the tax departments within the general civil service, the creation
of revenue authorities is seen as a solution. Revenue
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authorities can have their own compensation scales outside the
civil service. And, thus, have the ability to pay salaries based on
performance, attract qualified staff and retain them once trained
(Vehorn and Brondolo, 1999:501; Devas et al, 2001:214). The
compensation scales, used in revenue authorities' differ from
country to country.
The creation of a revenue authority also provides an opportunity
to consolidate a range of allowances paid to staff some of which
can be non-monetised and tax free while some of which can be
regular, taxable salary based on classification which is
determined by performance (Devas et al, 2001:214).
3.5.2. Flexibility in human resource management
Human resource management is critical for the development of
any organization. Effectiveness and efficiency are a daydream
without appropriate human resource management. That is why
appropriate human resource management is desirable in tax
administration. According to Jenkins (1994:76), an important
factor that determines the efficiency of the tax administration is
the accessibility and retention of qualified human resource. This
view is also shared by Schlemenson (1992:343).
It is imperative that the human resource of a tax administration
be managed in a flexible manner to achieve the desired
efficiency and effectiveness in tax administration. The move to
a revenue authority model provides the opportunity to achieve
this flexibility in the way human resources are managed. Devas
et al. (2001: 214) state that in some countries, the main reason
for creating the revenue authority is to get rid of the constraints
imposed by the civil service rules, rather than the level of
compensation. The civil service rules makes hiring and firing of
employees difficult.
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Staff employed in the tax departments can remain there, even if
they are found to be incompetent, inefficient and corrupt. This is
just because the civil service rules in many countries protect
employees from being fired (Vehorn and Brondolo, 1999:501;
Devas et aI., 2001: 214). This is best explained by the old
saying:" government workers are like headless nails: you can
easily get them in, but you cannot get them out" (Osborne and
Gaebler, 1992:126).
The regulations governing the public service also create a
problem in hiring. Managers cannot use the normal process
followed in the private sector and hiring of new employees
usually takes too long. This results in positions remaining
unfilled for a long period oftime (Devas et aI., 2001: 214).
The revenue authority model provides the tax administration
with a solution to curb the above problems and manage its
human resources with a private sector mentality. Vehorn and
Brondolo (1999:501) noted that "under an independent revenue
board, following the lines of the central bank model, free of civil
service rules, staff could be compensated on the basis of merit
and more easily fired if found guilty of incompetence and
corruption. It is also easier to undertake a large staff
retrenchment programme, which is badly needed by some
overstaffed tax administrations."
However, even with the establishment of the revenue authority
there are certain constraints. Any organization, no matter
whether it is public or private, works within the legal and political
environment of a given country. The retrenchment of staff is
therefore influenced by the legal and political environment. In
South Africa, for instance, the legal framework that established
the South African Revenue Authority requires it to consult the
trade unions in all matters concerning staffing. This is the result
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of the power that South African trade unions have (Devas et al.,
2001: 214).
3.5.3 Integration of tax operations
The integration or amalgamation of the tax operations under
one revenue authority is another advantage of the creation of
the revenue authority model. In the majority of countries tax
administration is divided between two or three organizations:
Customs and Excise, Inland or Internal Revenue and Sales
taxNAT. Sales taxNAT is sometimes attached to Customs and
Excise or Inland or Internal Revenue (Devas et al., 2001: 215;
Vehorn and Brondolo, 1999:500).
In such kinds of diffused revenue collection systems, one
Department, namely Customs and Excise is vested with the
power of collecting taxes at the border. The inland or internal
revenue collects the domestic or internal taxes (Vehom and
Brondolo, 1999:500). The above practice of collecting taxes by
different diffused departments has its own disadvantages. First,
since each department tends to focus on its own priorities
without giving much attention to the economies of scale that
could be achieved through integration or even coordination of
common processes and procedures, efficiency suffers (Vehom
and Brondolo, 1999:500).
Second, the opportunity for information sharing among the
departments, which could be achieved by having a common
taxpayer's identification number (TIN), is lost. Third, the
opportunity to coordinate auditing in the departments is wasted
(Vehom and Brondolo, 1999:500).
From the perspective of tax administration, integration of tax
operations improves efficiency and effectiveness of collection
by curbing the above three problems. That is, information
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sharing can be facilitated by establishing a common taxpayer's
identification number (TIN). By developing a master file that
contains data on all the taxes paid by taxpayers a
comprehensive auditing strategy can be executed. And, most
importantly, by having the so-called "one- stop service centers"
compliance costs of taxpayers will be reduced (Vehorn and
Brondolo, 1999:500).
This view is also shared by Devas et al. (2001:215). According
to Devas et al., (2001: 215) the integration of tax operations
under one revenue authority offers the tax administration the
capacity to structure revenue collection by function rather than
by taxes and to gain economies of scale and information.
3.5.4. Flexibility in budget management
Another advantage of the creation of the revenue authority is
the flexibility revenue authorities achieve in managing their
budget, without constraints of public service budgeting
regulations (Devas et al., 2001:215). According to Ott (1998:2),
since tax administrations are part of the wider public
administration they suffer from budget restrictions. The budget
restrictions have their own consequences: Employees of the
public administration earn less salary than their counter-parts in
the private sector. The low salaries in turn result in failure to
attract qualified employees and in the exodus of qualified
employees to the private sector.
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3.6. Arguments against the revenue authority
model
Everything has an advantage and a disadvantage. The revenue
authority model is no exception. The disadvantages or
weaknesses will be described below.
3.6.1. Higher costs
The cost that is incurred with the establishment of the revenue
authorities is one of the disadvantages cited against the
revenue authority model. While the ability to pay staff a salary,
which is competitive in relation to the private sector is presented
as the main argument in favour of the revenue authority model,
it is argued that it leads to higher costs. These higher salaries
may be offset by reducing the number of employees, and by
getting rid of corrupt and inefficient employees. However, in the
majority of cases, costs related to paying higher salaries will
increase. This argument can be rendered invalid if revenues
increase as the result of the establishment of the revenue
authority since the ratio of collection costs to tax yield would be
maintained (Devas et aL, 2001:216).
The only argument, then, is whether costs, including wider
economic and social costs, which are greater than necessary to
accomplish the increase in tax revenue, are imposed on the
society. This could occur because the revenue authority is
paying more than is necessary to recruit staff, particularly to
those at the top, and uses its budgetary flexibility to indulge in
costly offices and other overhead costs. This argument has a
strong pragmatic basis where a revenue authority is allowed to
retain and use a percentage share of tax revenues (Devas et
al.,2001:216).
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Having seen the rise in costs, as one of the main arguments
against the revenue authority model the question is that
whether costs have increased or not in practice. This is
because an assessment of what has occurred is incomplete
without an analysis of the total cost of operating the revenue
authority model. According to Devas et al (2001:216) even
though it is difficult to obtain information on costs because of
less transparency, costs have certainly increased with the
establishment of the revenue authorities. But this is not
surprising since it is necessary and costly to address those
sectors and tax payers, which were difficult to tax.
3.6.2. Impact on the wider civil service
One of the negative consequences of the executive agency
model is the fragmentation of the public service. With the
adoption of the revenue authorities certain problems are likely
to appear. One is that the fact that employees in the revenue
authority are paid higher salary than those in the other public
organizations creates jealousies and as a result there is
reluctance to cooperate. This is especially true on the part of
those with whom the revenue authority has to work: The
Ministry of Finance, the police, and the courts. In addition, the
performance of the revenue authority can be frustrated because
of the weaknesses of the above public organizations. The
problem is also aggravated by the pay differentials (Devas et
al.,2001:217).
As experience has shown in the case of Uganda the increase in
compensation in the revenue authority may contribute to
pressure for increased salary in the rest of the civil service. But
experience in Ghana has also shown that the increase in tax
revenue yield that resulted with the adoption of the revenue
authority is used to increase compensation throughout the civil
service, lubricating wider civil service reform. But this is not
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always the case as fragmentation may hinder the over-all
reform of the civil service (Devas et al., 2001:217).
3.6.3. Risks of autonomy
The fact that giving an organization greater autonomy from the
civil service carries risks is given as another reason against the
creation of the revenue authority. Civil service rules and
regulations are justified in terms of protecting public resources
and the public from abuse. The problem, however, is the
conflict between procedures that are slow, rigid and leave no
scope for innovation and entrepreneurship and the need for
flexibility to achieve targets and respond to immediate
conditions. The argument is that greater autonomy and
independence can be abused unless it is checked by the tax
policy itself. Therefore it is argued that autonomy still requires
an appropriate regulatory framework within which it is to be
exercised, which in tum requires appropriate targets and
performance measures and their application (Devas et aI.,
2001:217).
3.6.4. Corruption
Revenue authorities are usually vested with greater autonomy
and the power to administer their personnel and finance. But
this has resulted in corruption. A case in point is the Ugandan
Revenue Authority. In Uganda the autonomy that was intended
to protect the organization from political interference and which
allowed management to improve performance also allowed the
re-emergence of corruption (Devas et al., 2001:217).
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3.6.5. The question of the sustainability of the revenue
authority
The sustainability of the newly created revenue authorities can
also be considered one of the disadvantages of revenue
authorities. Autonomy that was first enjoyed by the newly
minted revenue authorities in Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and
Mexico was later jeopardized (Taliercia, 2001:2-20).
3.6.6. The question of the necessity of the revenue
authority
Another argument against the adoption of the revenue authority
centres on the necessity of the revenue authority to address the
problems facing tax administrations. Is a semi-autonomous
revenue authority really necessary to improve tax
administration? This is a question that is raised by those who
argue against the revenue authority model. Devas et al.
(2001:216) argue that the creation of the revenue authority
model works best when the financial position of a country is dire
and the civil service pay scale offers little reward to those with
the necessary skills.
3.7. Organizational design for revenue authorities
The organizational design applied by revenue authorities is not
the same in all countries. There are some variations from
country to country. In this section an outline of key
organizational design features, focusing on legal foundation,
governance framework, funding basis or financing, personnel,
and internal organization will be presented.
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3.7.1. Legal foundation
The legal foundation upon which revenue authorities are
created varies from country to country. According to the World
Bank (2002) the differences emanate from different legal forms
since different countries have different constitutions and public
administration laws that they can use to create more or less
autonomous agencies.
The legal foundation of the revenue authority defines its legal
character and its ability to own assets. The issue of whether or
not the revenue authority has its own separate legal character
is a fundamental design characteristic. Revenue authorities that
lack their own legal character are more subordinate to
Ministries of Finance.
As can be seen from Table 2 below different revenue
authorities have different kinds of legal framework. Peru's
National Tax Administration Superintendency (SUNAT) is
established by legislative law, while Venezuela's National
Integrated Tax Administration Service (SENlAT) is created by
presidential decree. Both the South African Revenue Service
(SARS) and Kenyan Revenue Authority are established by an
act of parliament (See Table 2). likewise in Ghana the
Revenue authority Governing Board (RAGB), which replaced
the National Revenue Secretariat (NRS), is established by an
act of parliament (Terkper, 1999:173).
When it comes to the legal form of the revenue authorities
Peru's National Tax Administration Superintendency (SUNAT)
is a decentralized public organization, while Venezuela's
National Integrated Tax Administration Service (SENlAT) is an
autonomous institute. The South African Revenue Service
(SARS) is a public sector organization outside the public
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service, while the Kenyan Revenue Authority (KRA) is a
corporate body (World Bank, 2002; RSA, 1997).
The right to own assets is also an important determinant of
autonomy. A revenue authority that can own assets is more
autonomous in that it is less dependent on the Ministry of
Finance for the use of physical infrastructure and supplies
(World Bank, 2002).
Mexico's Tax Administration Service (SAT), for example, is
dependent on the Ministry of Finance for permission to use
assets and is subject to ministerial decisions to revoke user
rights or reassign assets within the ministry. The lack of
property rights weakens the .managerial autonomy of the
revenue authority and subjects it to uncertainty in the use and
availability of physical assets (World Bank, 2002). Similarly
Venezuela's National Integrated Tax Administration Service
(SENlAT) cannot own its assets. In contrast, Peru's National
Tax Administration Superintendency (SUNAT), South Africa's
Revenue Service (SARS), and Kenya's Revenue Authority
(KRA) can own their assets (See Table 2).
Thus from this one can conclude even though there are
similarities between revenue authorities, there are certain
differences based on the legal framework on which the revenue
authorities are established.
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Table 2: legal framework of diverse revenue authorities
Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2002.
3.7.2. Governance structures
According to the World Bank (2002) the governance structure,
which determines to a large extent the effective level of
autonomy, is perhaps the most basic issue of organizational
design. There are certain issues that must be considered in the
governance structure.
These are first, whether the revenue authority is dominated by
the Minister of Finance or not. This is crucial since structures in
which the Minister of Finance dominates the governance
process yield less autonomy. The second issue, according to
Jenkins (1994: 78), is related to the criterion for membership on
the board. That is, whether there should be private sector
representation on the board, and, if so, whether private sector
positions should be fixed in the legislation or open to the
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discretion of the minister. The third issue is whether the CEO
should be appointed to a fixed term (World Bank, 2002).
In the literature there is no unanimous consensus on the
representation of the private sector on the revenue board.
Some are in favour of representation of the private sector in the
revenue board for it is assumed that it ensures that the interests
of the private sector are protected against the perceived
arbitrary decisions of the public servants. Some are against the
idea of having representatives of the private sector on the
board. The reasons given are: One, having a representative of
the private sector in the board can give the impression that tax
laws are not enforced fairly and can raise questions on the
credibility and integrity of members. Two, members from the
private sector will have inside information and might use this for
their private gain. Three, their membership would be viewed
with suspicion and concern and could raise questions when
members or their clients tax decisions are made (Jenkins,
1994:78; Vehorn and Brondolo, 1999:501;Terkper, 1999: 174;
Devas et al. 2001:217-218).
Revenue authorities are characterized by two general
governance models: a chief executive officer (CEO) model,
used only in Latin America, and a board of director's model,
used mostly in Africa and Asia. In Latin America it is only in the
case of Mexico that the board of directors model is used (World
Bank,2002).
There are fewer variations between CEO-based models and
board-based models. The main organizational design difference
observed within CEO-based models is the appointment of the
CEO. Venezuela's SENlAT is managed by a Superintendent
and Adjunct Superintendent, both of whom are appointed and
removed by the Minister of Finance. SUNAT's superintendent,
on the other hand, is named and removed by the President of
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the Republic, on the suggestion of the Minister of Finance with
the approval of the Council of Ministers. The appointment of the
Superintendent by the President is a mechanism that seems to
increase revenue authority autonomy (World Bank, 2002).
3.7.2.1. Responsibilities of the Revenue Board
In the African cases a board of directors is responsible for
overseeing the management of the revenue authority. This
seems natural as revenue authorities are established to be run
with the mentality of the private sector. These boards vary from
country to country in size, composition, and their relation to the
commissioner-general (CG) (World Bank, 2002).
Jenkins (1994:77) states that the mission of a revenue board
should be to "promote voluntary compliance to the highest
degree possible; to continuously improve the administration of
the tax laws by ensuring the nation's revenue is collected and to
ensure the tax laws are administered fairly, efficiently, and
effectively with a high degree of integrity."
Jenkins (1994:77) further identifies some responsibilities that
the revenue board should fulfil so that it will be able to
accomplish the objectives of the organization. These are:
• Ensure that the tax laws are enforced with the highest
degree of integrity;
• Ensure that the departments (customs, excise and
income) coordinate and share information when and
where there is a need;
• Establish an overall pay and classification structure;
• Provide guidance and direction in resource allocation
(make sure the resources are allocated properly between
and among the various functions of the departments);
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• Ensure that appropriate personnel and programme
management practices are in place and carried out (this
would include such things as training, programme
management and personnel evaluations and corrective
actions taken if appropriate);
• Recommend to the Minister of Finance legislative
changes needed to improve the administration of the tax
laws;
• Establish an internal audit function staffed by
professional auditors who would be responsible for
determining whether or not the policies of the board are
being carried out properly (the annual audit plan should
be approved by the board);
• Provide the Minister of Finance with revenue estimates
on existing and proposed tax laws; and
• Establish and implement a written code of conduct for all
employees in the departments and the board.
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Table 3: Governance Structure of Revenue Authorities
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2002)
3.7.2.2. Size of the Revenue board
Another issue in the governance structure is the size of the
revenue board. According to Jenkins (1994:78) the size of the
revenue board is an important factor in the efficient functioning
of the board and thus the revenue authority. Jenkins (1994:78)
advises that the size of the board should be kept to the
minimum for the reasons cited below:
• A large board makes it difficult to schedule meetings and
come to a consensus;
• The larger the board the more difficult it may be to locate
individuals that do not have outside interests and who
will be perceived to have a conflict of interest; and
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• The larger the board membership the less individual
accountability. Too few may not provide sufficient
support or overall experience to carry out the board's
responsibilities.
The size of the revenue board varies from country to country.
As can be seen from the governance structure in Table 3, the
SARS board consists of up to eight persons named by the
Minister of Finance, the commissioner, and up to two senior
SARS employees named by the commissioner. Currently,
business people, consultants, and academics sit on the board.
The Minister of Finance names the SARS commissioner, after
screening the choice with the cabinet and the board. In Kenya
the board consists of a chairman appointed by the president,
the CG, high level civil service officers from the Ministry of
Finance, the Attorney-general, and six other persons appointed
by the Minister. The KRA's CG is also appointed by the
minister.
The Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA) board has nine
members. Unlike most of its regional counterparts, the ZRA
board consists in part of private sector representatives,
including the association of chambers of commerce and
industry, the bankers' association, the institute of certified
accountants, and the law association (these representatives are
nominated directly by their organizations, as specified in the
ZRA Act) (Jenkins, 1994:80; World Bank, 2002).
In Mexico the SAT's board of directors is composed of the
following members: the Minister of Finance, two representatives
from the ministry as designated by the minister, the President of
the SAT, and two senior SAT employees designated by the
president. Membership on the SAT's first board consisted of the
undersecretary for revenue, and the director of the tax policy
unit for the ministry and the chiefs of legal affairs and audits for
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the SAT. The SAT president is appointed directly by the
president of the Republic (World Bank, 2002).
From the above discussion one can see that the size of the
revenue board is not the same in all revenue authorities. The
size and composition of the revenue board varies from country
to country. Jenkins (1994:78), however, is of the view that the
size of the revenue board should be between five and nine.
3.7.3. Staffing
The other important issue in the organizational design is
staffing. According to Devas et al., (2001:219) there are two
approaches in which staff can be appointed in a newly
established revenue authority. One approach is to advertise all
jobs. This means that even the staff in the existing tax
departments will be required to apply and compete like any
other applicant. The other approach is to appoint all staff
(perhaps with few exceptions) of the existing tax department as
employees of the established revenue authority.
Experience has shown that both approaches are used by
revenue authorities in different countries. Uganda has used the
first approach that is advertising all jobs to all including the
employees of the existing tax departments. This approach has
the advantage of getting rid of corrupt and inefficient staff. In
contrast, in Kenya the second approach namely transferring
staff to the new organization is used. The latter approach has
an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that it is
politically easier to implement while the disadvantage is that the
opportunity of getting rid of corrupt and inefficient employees is
lost. In South Africa, generous redundancy packages were
given prior to the establishment of SARS and many people
were encouraged to leave. But this has the disadvantage of
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losing competent staff as has occurred in the South African
Customs and Excise (Devas et al., 2001:219).
What is explained above is how staff is appointed when the
existing tax administrations are replaced by the newly
established revenue authorities. There is also the question of
who appoints the staff. In the case of the KRA, the
commissioner-general (CG) appoints all staff members, except
the commissioners of customs and excise, income, and value
added taxes, who are appointed by the revenue board. The
terms and conditions of employment are determined by the
revenue board (World Bank, 2002). In the case of South Africa,
the law that sets the SARS requires the board to determine the
terms and conditions of employment after consulting the trade
unions that are powerful in South Africa. Then the
commissioner appoints the staff (RSA, 1997; Devas et al.
2001:214; World Bank, 2002).
In latin America SUNAT has a great deal of control over its
staffing system in comparison to the other revenue authorities
in latin America and the rest of the world. The president of
Peru granted SUNAT the authority (by issuing a separate
decree based on a legislative enabling law) to adopt a non-
public sector personnel regime. Therefore unlike SARS in the
case of South Africa, SUNAT has the authority to hire and fire
its employees without the need to consult with any other public
sector entity. In addition, SUNAT is vested with the power to set
its own salary structure, if its budget allows this. So the only
limitation is its budget. SUNAT must, however, not set salaries
that exceed the maximum amount set by the ministry's Office of
State Institutions and Organizations (OIOE), although in
practice this does not seem to be a binding constraint (World
Bank,2002).
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Table 4: Staffing in Revenue Authorities
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2002)
3.7.4. Funding Basis
The issue of funding is also fundamental to the effective
functioning of the revenue authority. There are two funding
approaches or mechanisms. One is fixed, the other variable.
The fixed budget approach is an approach in which a certain
amount of the budget is allocated to the revenue authority. In
the variable approach the budget is a function of the tax
revenue collected. This means that the revenue authority is
allowed to retain a percentage of the tax revenue collected
(Devas et al., 2001:219; Taliercio, 2001:4; World Bank, 2002).
Both approaches have an advantage and a disadvantage. The
advantage of the fixed budget approach is that it is easy to
make corrections on the budget based on the previous year
budget. The advantages of a variable budget approach are:
One, it gives the revenue authority more autonomy as it is not
required to submit its budget to the Ministry of Finance for
approval. Two, it can motivate the revenue authority towards
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better performance for rewards are based on the tax revenue
collected (Devas et al., 2001:219).
Along with the advantages of each approach described above
there are also their respective disadvantages. One
disadvantage common to both approaches is the difficulty of
setting the level of the budget, as budgets set are not in any
way related to the resources actually required to run the
revenue authority. This disadvantage being shared by both
approaches, the variable budget approach has additional
disadvantages.
These are: One, tax revenue is not only the function of the
performance of the revenue authority. Tax revenue can
increase not only by good performance of the revenue authority
but also by changes in tax policy, changes in tax rates or
exemptions and changes in the economy. This is what
happened in Zambia. The initial arrangement allowed the
Zambian Revenue Authority to retain a percentage share of the
total tax revenue collected. But later on it became clear that tax
revenues were increasing significantly for reasons unrelated to
the performance of the revenue authority prompting the initial
arrangement to be replaced by a negotiated budget allocation
(Devas et al., 2001:219).
Second, the revenue authority may focus on an easy to tax
sectors and tax payers in an effort to collect more taxes while
other goals like identifying tax defaulters, tackling arrears,
accelerating trade and controlling banned goods are ignored
(Devas et al., 2001: 219-220).
A common compromise position besides the two approaches
discussed above is to have either a fixed budget or a variable
budget based on the tax revenue collected and then have an
additional percentage of the tax collected above a specified
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target. The Kenyan Revenue Authority (KRA) is a good
example. The KRA retains 1.5% of the budgeted tax yield for
the year and an additional 3% of any surplus above the target.
But even this approach does not solve the problem of setting
the percentage share and the target so as to relate funding with
what the organization actually needs. In Kenya there is a view
that the basic percentage is set too low hindering the
development of the Kenyan Revenue Authority (Devas et al.,
2001:219-220).
3.7.5. Internal organisation
There are many ways in which revenue authorities can be
organised. The discussion of types of organizational structure
for tax administration (Vehom and Brondolo, 1999: 502) points
out three most common models of structuring the tax
administration: (1) by type of tax, (2) by administrative function,
and (3) by type of tax payer. The three models will be discussed
below.
3.7.5.1. By type of tax
Structuring the tax administration according to type of tax, in
which tax departments are set up to administer specific types of
taxes, is the oldest form of organizational structure. This type of
organizational structure has one key characteristic in that each
department contains all functions (like assessment, collection
and audit) that are necessary for the tax department to carry out
its responsibilities (Vehom and Brondolo, 1999:502).
Tax administrations, which are organised by type of tax, have
advantages and disadvantages. Vehom and Brondolo
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(1999:502) identify the main advantages of the by type of tax
organizational structure as follows:
1) It establishes clear accountability and control for each tax.
Responsibility for any developments relating to a particular
tax can be traced directly to the head of the relevant tax
department who, in turn, has authority over a complete
administrative apparatus to react to emerging problems;
2) It allows the tax administration to respond quickly to
changing circumstances, such as when new tax legislation
is introduced or collection problems are encountered;
3) It is particularly advantageous for countries that operate in
unstable fiscal environments; and
4) In countries where widely different administrative
procedures are used for different taxes, the tax-based
approach allows the various tax departments to develop
specialized programmes that are best suited to the
administrative requirements of their set of taxes.
The above being the advantages, there are also disadvantages
which come with organizing by type of tax. First, the system
may result in high administrative cost and low staff productivity
because each department supports its own network of offices
independently from the other departments and thus
administrative functions are duplicated. Second, the compliance
costs of the taxpayers tend to be high. This is because the
taxpayers find it difficult to comply with the different
requirements of each tax department each of which follows its
own administrative procedures. The compliance costs
associated with this form of organization will certainly vary with
a taxpayer's scale of operations and number of tax liabilities
(Vehom and Brondolo, 1999:502).
Third, there is a possibility for collusion between taxpayers and
tax officials. Each department operates independently from the
other tax departments, and staff, who perform different
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administrative functions within each tax department, tend to
have close contact with one another. This situation weakens the
checks and balances both between and within the tax
departments and encourages collusive action (Vehorn and
Brondolo, 1999:502).
3.7.5.2. By function
The other common organizational structure is the function-
based model. The main distinctive feature of this type of
organization is that staff are grouped around an organization's
key functions or work processes. In tax administration this
means that separate departments are established to perform
each major administrative function process (processing tax
returns and payments, auditing tax payers and collecting
arrears) over the full range of taxes. In this type of
organizational structure there is the tax administration's chief
executive officer at the top and each functional department is
headed by a manager who is directly under the chief executive
officer (Vehorn and Brondolo, 1999:503).
Functional organizations have their own weaknesses and
strengths. The main strength of the functional organization is
that it helps the tax administration to improve the taxpayers'
compliance with the tax laws that is one of the main problems of
various tax administrations. It is possible to do so by having one
department (audit, collection enforcement, and taxpayer
services) that addresses each major form of non-compliance
(underreporting, arrears and unintentional mistakes). What
makes the functional organization improve the compliance cost
is the fact that senior staff get the opportunity to manage all
administrative functions across all taxes instead of managing
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different functions for a single type of tax. In addition it is easy
for the tax administration to conduct comprehensive compliance
programmes such as joint audits of indirect and direct taxes
(Vehorn and Brondolo, 1999:503-504).
A second strength of the functional organization is that it
enables a tax administration to tackle one of the main
disadvantages of the by tax organization. That is it reduces
administrative costs and increases staff productivity. A third
advantage of functional organization is that it improves the
integrity of the tax administration by reducing the possibility for
collusion between taxpayers' and tax officials. Furthermore a
functional organizational structure can serve as a check and
balance among staff and the various functional departments.
Even though it is difficult to remove misconduct by merely
organizing the tax administration functionally, there is a
possibility of decreasing such behaviour since any collusion
between taxpayers' and tax officials in one department will be
detected by tax officials in other departments during the course
of their normal activities (Vehorn and Brondolo, 1999:504).
Although the function-based organization provides the above
advantages, it also suffers from one major weakness. The
main weakness of functional organization arises from the way it
is organized. In a function-based organization each functional
department concentrates on a narrow aspect of taxpayers'
affairs and in isolation from the activities carried out by other
departments. Thus the fragmented nature of the organization
causes the tax administration to carry out its duties poorly when
it deals with issues that cut across departmental boundaries
and leads to poor service to tax payers (Vehorn and Brondolo,
1999:504).
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3.7.5.3. By type of taxpayer
Another way in which the tax administration can be organized is
by type of taxpayer where staff are assigned to departments
that concentrate on specific groups of taxpayers'. The groups
can be differentiated based on the taxpayers' scale of
operation, form of ownership or economic sector (Vehom and
Brondolo, 1999:504).
Like any other form of organization this approach to organizing
the tax administration has strengths and weaknesses. The first
benefit is that it offers the opportunity to strengthen the
accountability for achieving organizational outcomes. In this
form of organization each department is responsible for a
specific group of taxpayers' and thus has the ability to achieve
the ultimate objectives of the tax administration like promoting
compliance, improving services and increasing productivity
(Vehom and Brondolo, 1999:503).
In a function-based organisation this cannot be easily
accomplished since the objectives cut across the boundaries of
many functional departments. In contrast, if the organisation is
structured by taxpayers it can diminish the problem by
establishing a direct link between each department and its
specific group of taxpayers. Thus it makes it easier to the
performance and outcome of each department (Vehom and
Brondolo, 1999:505).
A second benefit of a taxpayer-based organization is that it
enables the organization to allocate resources based on the
risks posed by each group of taxpayers to the normal function
of tax collection. The third and final benefit of the taxpayer-
based organization is that it enables the tax organization to
improve the compliance level by tailoring enforcement and
educational programmes according to the compliance pattem of
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each group of taxpayers. It thus has the potential for achieving
high levels of compliance and better quality of services to
taxpayers (Vehom and Brondolo, 1999:505).
These being the strengths of the taxpayer-based organization it
also suffers from many potential disadvantages. First, since
common functions are being replicated across taxpayer-based
departments, administrative costs might increase. Second, the
model in itself is unlikely to achieve a high level of taxpayer
compliance, if sufficient skilled staff are not available. On the
contrary, it might even lead to a decline in compliance as the
small number of skilled staff will be forced to stretch across the
organisation. This shows that the achievement of a taxpayer-
based organization depends not only on the model itself but
also on the availability of highly skilled staff to redesign the
administration's enforcement and educational programmes so
that they are better suited to the circumstances of each group of
taxpayers. But it is known that the shortage of highly skilled
staff is a problem in many countries (Vehom and Brondolo,
1999:505-506).
Third, since the taxpayer-based departments operate
independently it might lead to seemingly inconsistent
application of the tax laws across different groups of taxpayers
and might make the organization vulnerable to corruption. This
might cause the taxpayers to view the tax administration with
suspicion and lose confidence in the fairness of the tax system.
Ultimately this will lead to low levels of compliance. Thus, to
avoid this situation, the tax administration must apply a strict
internal audit and oversight programmes (Vehom and Brondolo,
1999:506).
The above discussions show that a tax administration can be
structured in three main organizational forms. In addition a mix
of the three can also be established. Now the question is, which
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one of the three types of organizational structures is applied in
the already established revenue authorities? As can be seen
from Table 5 below, there is no one type of organizational
structure that is consistently applied by all the revenue
authorities in various countries.
Table 5: Organizational structure of tax administration for
selected countries
Note: C= central level, R= regional level, L= local level, U= under Finance
Ministry, 0= outside Finance Ministry, P= part of tax administration,
S=separate from tax administration, and * = countries, which have
established revenue authority
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Under Placement
Finance of customs
~Q!.!nt~ MiDi~[ a~tax B~1aKl:!a~er a~film.tiQIl MiKed adrniDiS1[gtiQD
Albania Yes C L U,S
Argentina Yes C U,P
Armenia Yes L C U,S
Aruba Yes C U,P
Australia No C,R S
Austria Yes C,R L U,S
Azerbaiján No C R, L O,S
Bahamas Yes C, L U,S
Bangladesh Yes C,R,L S
Barbados Yes C U
Belarus No C,R,L O,S.
Belgium Yes C
Belize Yes C U,S
Bermuda Yes C U,S
Bhutan Yes C, R, L
Bolivia Yes R, L C
Botswana Yes C U,S
Brazil Yes C U,P
Brunei Yes U,S
Bulgaria Yes C,R,L S
Canada No C,R,L O,P
Cambodia Yes C, R, L U,S
Cameroon Yes C R, L U,S
Chile Yes C,R U
China No L C,R O,S
Colombia Yes R, L C U,S
Costarica Yes C U,S
Croatia Yes C, L U
Cyprus Yes L C,R
Czech Rep. Yes C,R L U,S
Denmark Yes R C
Dominican
Republic Yes L C U,S
Ecuador Yes C U,S
Egypt Yes C
EI Salvador Yes L C
Eritrea Yes C,R,L U,S
Estonia No C L O,S
Ethiopia No C,R O,P
Fiji Yes C U,S
Finland No R,L
France Yes C,R L U,S
Gambia Yes U,S
Georgia C,R,L S
Ghana* No C,R,L S
Greece Yes C U,S
Guatemala Yes C
Haiti Yes C U,S
Honduras Yes C U,S
Hungary No R, L C O,S
India Yes R,L C U,S
Indonesia Yes C R,L U,S
Iran Yes C U,S
Ireland Yes C
Israel Yes C, R, L
Jamaica * Yes L C U,S
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Under Placement
Finance of customes
Country Minister By tax By taxpayer By function Mixed administration
Japan
*Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lesotho
Lithuania
Macedonia
Malaysia
Mexico*
Moldova
Mongolia
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
Neth. Antilles
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
peru*
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Yes
No
Yes
R, L
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
C, L
C,L
C
C, L
R, L
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
C,R,L
Rwanda*
Sao Tome &
pnncipe Yes
SaudiArabia yes
Yes
Sierra Leone Yes
Singapore No
Slovak Rep. No C, R, L
Slovenia Yes
South Africa* Yes C,R,L
S . *pam
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Tajikistan
Tanzania*
Thailand
Yes
Yes C
Yes
No C, R
No
NoC, R, L
No C, R
Yes C, R, L
R,L
C, L
C,R,L
C,R,L
C
C,R,L
R, L
L
C
C
L
C
C,R
L
C,R
C
C,R,L
L
C
C
C
R, L
C, L
C
C
C
R C
C,R
C
C
C
C,R,L
L C,R
C
C
C, R, L
C
C
U
0, P
°
U,S
U,S
O,P
U,P
U
U,S
U
U,S
O,S
U,S
U
U,P
U
U,S
U,P
U,S
U,P
C
U,P
U,S
U,S
U,S
O,S
U
U,S
U
U,S
U,S
O,S
U,P
L
U,P
U,P
U
U,P
O,S
O,S
0, P
U,S
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Under Placement
Finance ofcustomes
Coyntry Minister By tax By taxpayer By function Mixed administration
Trindad
&Tobago Yes C U,S
Turkey Yes L C O,S
Turkmenistan No C R, L O,S
• No C, R, L O,PUganda
Ukraine No C,R,L O,S
United Kingdom Yes C, L U,S
United States Yes C,R,L U,S
Uruguay Yes C U,S
Uzbekistan No C,R,L O,S
Venezuela· Yes C, R, L O,S
Vietnam Yes C, L O,S
WestbanklGaza Yes C, R, L U,S
Yemen Yes R, L C U,S
Zambia· No C,R,L O,P
Zimbabwe Yes C U,S
Source: Adapted from Vehom & Brandalo, 1999: 499
In the above table there are 12 countries that have established
semi-autonomous revenue authorities. From the table the
following observations can be made. One observation is that,
most of the countries with established revenue authorities are in
Africa and Latin America. The second observation is that all
revenue authorities do not have the same type of organizational
structure. Three out of 12 countries in the table are organized
by type of tax. One out of 12 countries is organized by taxpayer.
Most of these countries, that is five out of 12, are organized by
function. Three out of twelve countries have a mixed type of
organizational structure.
The third observation is that some of the customs departments
(five out of 12) are placed outside the Ministry of Finance while
others (six out of 12) are placed under the Ministry of Finance.
But in most of these countries the customs department is
combined with the tax department This shows the fact that in
countries operating under a revenue authority the trend is
toward the consolidation of the various tax departments.
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A final observation is even though many countries in the table,
including those operating under a revenue authority, place their
tax department under the ministry of finance half of the
countries, which have established revenue authority, place their
tax department outside the ministry of finance favouring the
current trend of more tax administration autonomy (Vehorn and
Brondolo, 1999:507).
3.8. Chapter summary
In this chapter the theoretical framework of the revenue
authority model was discussed. From the literature it is clear
that the creation of semi-autonomous revenue authorities is
gaining momentum. But there is still an ongoing debate in
favour of and against revenue authorities.
The argument for revenue authorities is based on the following
facts: One, revenue authorities can improve the compensation
scale of tax employees when they are autonomous from the
general civil service. Two, they can be flexible in managing their
human resource in a private sector like mentality. Three, they
have the flexibility to manage their budget being independent
from the ministry of finance. The fourth and most important
argument for the revenue authority model is the ability to
consolidate the tax functions and thus improve the efficiency of
the tax administration.
The arguments against the revenue authority model are: One,
the increase in costs because of the establishment of the
revenue authority. Two, the fear that the revenue authority may
lead to the fragmentation of the public service. Three, the risk
that arises because of the autonomy exercised by the revenue
authority. Four, revenue authorities being independent, they
can be susceptible to corruption.
50
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The internal organisation of revenue authorities is also
discussed. It is found that there is no one type of organizational
structure, which is consistently applied by all the revenue
authorities in various countries. Some are organised by type of
tax while some are organised by function and still others by
type of taxpayer. Finally it is important to note that the revenue
authority model can be well worth considering although it is not
a panacea for every thing.
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Chapter four
4. Conclusion
The ultimate objective of tax administration should be to
implement the tax system efficiently, and effectively and to fullfill
the constitutional requirement that all citizens bear the burden
of public expenditure according to their economic ability. To
fullfill these objectives tax administration reform is taking place
in many countries. In this paper the creation of revenue
authorities as one strategy of improving the tax administration is
discussed.
The objective of the paper is, then, to investigate whether
revenue authorities are the right vehicles for successful
implementation of tax administration reform. To achieve this aim
an attempt was made through the use of literature review. Much
of the literature on revenue authorities is descriptive, discussing
the arguments for and against revenue authorities and
elaborating the organizational design of revenue authorities and
why they are important in today's competitive world.
Even though there are variations between countries, generally
the established revenue authorities have the following key
characteristics: autonomy from civil service regulations with
respect to hiring and firing staff, the amalgamation of
traditionally separate tax departments namely the Inland
Revenue and customs departments, and flexibility in managing
their budget. The amalgamation of customs and income tax
departments under the revenue authorities is a particularly
noteworthy African trend.
The disadvantages of the revenue authority model are: the
increase in costs, the possibility that the revenue authority may
lead to the fragmentation of the public service, the risk of abuse
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of the public and public resources, which arises because of the
autonomy exercised by the revenue authority an dcorruption.
To overcome the above disadvantages it is recommended that:
• One, there should be a clearly defined relationship
between the government and the revenue authority so as
to prevent the fragmentation of the public service. The
relationship should usually be through the Ministry of
Finance, which should be responsible for fiscal policy
and regulation of the organization.
• Two, the autonomy granted to the revenue authority has
to be matched by an appropriate regulatory framework
and public accountability that sets policies and targets
and monitors performance. This can prevent the public
and public resources from being abused.
• Three, the tax structure should be as simple as possible
so that tax officers have minimum discretionary authority
and thus prevent corruption.
Finally it can be said that even though the literature on the
arguments for and against revenue authorities is not conclusive,
there is more evidence that the revenue authority model
improves the tax administration than otherwise.
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